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V-1. Rotate.
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As Air Algérie
Flight 62-89
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lifts off from
Tamanrasset, Algeria...
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Gear up.
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...air traffic
controllers hear an explosion.
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The plane crashes
into the desert.
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102 people are killed.
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Investigators examine engine
debris found on the runway.
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It looks like there's
a fatigue crack
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in the nozzle guide vane.
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They know
an engine failed
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but not why the
pilots couldn't recover.
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Pilots
are expected to fly out
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of a situation either
on takeoff or landing
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where they've lost an engine.
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The investigation reveals
a crew that was struggling
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not with the plane...
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Let go. Take your hand away.
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I let go. I let go.
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...but with each other.
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Which one of them is actually
flying the plane?
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Mayday! Mayday!
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Pull up!
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{\an8}It's early afternoon
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{\an8}in the middle of the
Sahara Desert in Algeria.
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{\an8}The crew of Flight 62-89 readies
for its upcoming journey
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{\an8}at the remote
Tamanrasset Aguenar Airport.
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Seatbelts...
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There are 97
passengers on board.
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Among them, members of
the local football team
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headed to a tournament
and military personnel.
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Seatbelts...
Seatbelts...
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Though there are some
European nationals,
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almost everyone
on board is Algerian.
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Nav and instrument
transfer switches...
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normal.
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In the cockpit,
preflight checks are underway.
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Yaw Damper...
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on.
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Today's flight is operated
by Air Algérie,
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a state-owned national carrier.
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Air Algérie
is a publicly owned
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company that is owned
by the country of Algeria.
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The country takes a lot of pride
in this particular airline
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because it is the face
and name of the country
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as it goes all
around the world.
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62-89,
requesting latest weather.
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Yes, the wind is calm.
Temperature two-three.
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QNH 1-0-2-0. QFE 9-6-5.
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Copied, we'll call you
back for engine start.
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44-year-old Fatima Yousfi
is the first officer
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of this flight.
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She is Algeria's first
female commercial pilot.
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{\an8}The female first officer
was one of the first women
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{\an8}to be hired at an airline
in Algeria,
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{\an8}which would be a big deal
in such a male dominated field,
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{\an8}especially in that country.
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As the first woman
to pilot a Boeing 7-47
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transoceanic flight,
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Lynn Rippelmeyer, knows what
it's like to blaze a trail.
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Aviation was then, and still
is in some cases,
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a boys' club.
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Back in the beginning of when
women were initially beginning
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in aviation here in the States,
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maybe it's like it was for her,
that it was unusual.
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Tamanrasset, 62-89,
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we request clearance
for Ghardaïa.
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Received,
we will call you back.
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- Hey, Boualem.
- Hey.
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We've got some Tamanrasset
football players back there.
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Oh-ho. Tell them we're
rooting for them this weekend.
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48-year-old
Captain Boualem Benaouicha
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has over 10,000 flying hours.
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A thousand of those hours
are on the Boeing 7-37.
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The captain was highly
experienced, had been flying
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for over 20 years and had flown
all kinds of aircraft
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from small aircraft
to large jetliners.
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- 62-89, Tamanrasset.
- Go ahead.
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Start approved,
call back for taxi.
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Roger.
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At 3:00 p.m.,
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the pilots get clearance
to start-up the engines.
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Okay, Before Start checklist.
Fuel quantity.
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9800 kg.
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Pumps?
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On.
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Flight 62-89 is
a Boeing 7-37-200,
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an early generation of the
popular twin-engine jetliner.
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The Boeing 7-37 is one
of the most common types
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of commercial airliners
in the world
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and there are
different variations of it.
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The Boeing 7-37-200 is
a original version of the 7-37,
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so it's an older model.
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And it's not as highly
sophisticated in technology
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as the current 7-37s.
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Flight 62-89 will be
departing from Tamanrasset,
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with a scheduled
stop in Ghardaïa,
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and then on to
the capital, Algiers.
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The total flying time is
approximately three hours.
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Ready to taxi,
Air Algérie 62-89.
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62-89, Tamanrassat, taxi onto
runway zero two and backtrack,
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wind 0-3-0 at ten knots.
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Roger, taxing
to runway zero two,
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then backtracking, 62-89.
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As they taxi to the runway,
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passengers settle
in for the journey.
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We are ready, 62-89.
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62-89, Tamanrasset, cleared
for takeoff runway zero two,
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wind 3-3-0 at twelve knots.
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Cleared for
takeoff on runway zero two,
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Air Algérie 62-89.
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You have 90 knots...
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100 knots...
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V1... rotate.
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But seconds after takeoff...
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Gear up.
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...a loud explosion
rocks the airplane.
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Bismillah.
What's going on?
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The pilots assess
the situation.
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- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.
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Passengers sense something
has gone wrong.
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We have a small problem,
62-89.
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62-89,
Tamanrasset.
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The 7-37 is approaching
a stall.
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62-89, are you
in an emergency?
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Don't sink.
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Don't sink. Don't sink.
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The pilots make
desperate attempts
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to recover the aircraft.
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But their efforts are in vain.
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The plane goes into a freefall.
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The passengers brace themselves.
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The plane bursts into flames
and skids across the desert
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just outside
Tamanrasset airport.
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Emergency response
is immediately activated
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and firefighters
rush to the scene.
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The impact and the fire that
ensued afterwards
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made survival very unlikely for
the passengers in the aircraft.
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But then, against all odds,
rescuers discover a survivor.
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Not within the wreckage,
but lying in the distant sand,
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clinging to life.
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A gentleman seated all the way
in the back
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that didn't have
his seatbelt on,
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so when the airplane crashed
and, uh, broke apart,
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he was thrown free.
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He shows only faint signs
of life, as an ambulance
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rushes him to hospital
in critical condition.
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Defying all expectations,
the man's condition
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00:09:56,529 --> 00:09:59,907
soon stabilizes
and he begins to recover.
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This passenger's luck
cannot be overstated
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in what was Algeria's worst
aviation accident at the time.
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He is the sole survivor out of
103 passengers and crew.
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While the country mourns the
tragic loss of a football squad,
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Algerian and French families
grieve their loved ones
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and soon demand answers.
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The investigation
into the crash of Flight 62-89
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is conducted by
a Commission of Inquiry
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established by the
Algerian Ministry of Transport.
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They receive support from
several international agencies,
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including the NTSB,
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America's National
Transportation Safety Board.
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I was the US Accredited
Representative for this accident
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to assist the Algerians.
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Initially I wasn't going
to travel to the scene, however,
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the US Ambassador to Algeria
requested our assistance.
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While Algerian Investigators
await the arrival
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of their American colleagues,
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they interview the Tamanrasset
air traffic controller.
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Did the pilots indicate
that there was an issue?
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The first officer called
only seconds after takeoff.
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We have a small problem,
62-89.
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Pilots typically are hesitant
to call 'mayday mayday'
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or, uh, announce some type
of an emergency,
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particularly if, uh,
they really don't know what
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the situation and the critical
nature of the situation is.
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And what was the problem?
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They didn't say but I heard
something that
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sounded like an explosion.
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Seconds later, the plane
was falling out of the sky.
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You said an explosion?
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That's what it sounded like.
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Like a bomb?
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I couldn't say.
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So, in 2003 Algeria
was not the safest place.
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There was bombings
and terrorist activities
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because they were coming out
of 11 years of civil war.
187
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When the plane fell,
was it in one piece?
188
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Yes, it was.
189
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Investigators found
the airplane intact.
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00:12:36,147 --> 00:12:39,484
There were no claims
of responsibility by terrorists,
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so it pretty much ruled out
that there was
192
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some type of nefarious means
to bring the aircraft down.
193
00:12:46,824 --> 00:12:49,202
Can you describe
how the plane fell?
194
00:12:49,702 --> 00:12:52,246
It was...
195
00:12:52,246 --> 00:12:57,460
nose up and crashed near
the threshold of runway 20.
196
00:12:59,420 --> 00:13:02,048
The controller and other
witnesses saw
197
00:13:02,048 --> 00:13:04,300
that the airplane
was struggling to climb,
198
00:13:04,300 --> 00:13:09,472
had a nose high pitch attitude
and then impact the ground.
199
00:13:10,306 --> 00:13:13,017
Eyewitnesses recall
that the plane struggled
200
00:13:13,017 --> 00:13:15,061
to gain enough lift
to remain airborne,
201
00:13:15,061 --> 00:13:18,314
an indication
it was in a stall.
202
00:13:20,024 --> 00:13:21,609
One week after the incident,
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00:13:21,609 --> 00:13:26,572
Algerian Investigators are
joined by a member of the NTSB.
204
00:13:29,367 --> 00:13:31,577
The Air Traffic Controller
and witnesses
205
00:13:31,577 --> 00:13:33,204
describe seeing a stall.
206
00:13:33,204 --> 00:13:36,666
And one witness remarked
that the landing gear was down.
207
00:13:37,834 --> 00:13:41,295
If the landing gear is still
down while the aircraft
208
00:13:41,295 --> 00:13:45,591
is trying to climb, it creates
a lot of drag on that airplane.
209
00:13:45,591 --> 00:13:49,303
It takes a lot of thrust
and a lot of power to maintain
210
00:13:49,303 --> 00:13:53,182
the climb to overcome all that
drag from the landing gear.
211
00:13:54,350 --> 00:13:56,102
That would affect the
plane's ability to climb,
212
00:13:56,102 --> 00:13:59,147
but that alone
wouldn't cause a stall.
213
00:13:59,147 --> 00:14:01,274
There has to have been
something else.
214
00:14:01,274 --> 00:14:04,110
- Do you have the load sheets?
- Yes. Right here.
215
00:14:05,820 --> 00:14:09,198
One of the big questions
is about the aircraft weight,
216
00:14:09,198 --> 00:14:11,576
because if you're too heavy,
you won't climb as well
217
00:14:11,576 --> 00:14:14,203
as if you're within
the weight envelope.
218
00:14:15,455 --> 00:14:18,249
Investigators review the
plane's load sheet
219
00:14:18,249 --> 00:14:21,794
to see if the plane was
overweight before takeoff.
220
00:14:21,794 --> 00:14:22,962
It looks like
the first officer
221
00:14:22,962 --> 00:14:24,714
made some corrections here.
222
00:14:26,424 --> 00:14:29,761
While reviewing the load
sheet, the First Officer notices
223
00:14:29,761 --> 00:14:31,512
the fuel weight is wrong,
224
00:14:31,512 --> 00:14:36,059
and changes it from 88-hundred
kilograms to the correct amount
225
00:14:36,059 --> 00:14:38,394
of 9800 kilograms.
226
00:14:43,858 --> 00:14:45,568
So with those corrections
227
00:14:45,568 --> 00:14:47,779
the weight at takeoff
would have been
228
00:14:47,779 --> 00:14:50,239
48,708 kilograms.
229
00:14:50,239 --> 00:14:54,577
And the maximum weight allowed
at take off was 49,500 kg.
230
00:14:56,454 --> 00:14:59,415
The first officer noticed
that there was a thousand
231
00:14:59,415 --> 00:15:01,834
kilo difference and, uh,
the passenger count
232
00:15:01,834 --> 00:15:03,211
was a little bit off,
233
00:15:03,211 --> 00:15:04,462
which didn't make
a whole lot of difference
234
00:15:04,462 --> 00:15:06,506
in the overall
weight and balance,
235
00:15:06,506 --> 00:15:09,634
but did show that she was
very attentive in her duties.
236
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The aircraft weight
was right up
237
00:15:13,304 --> 00:15:14,639
against the maximum
takeoff weight.
238
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Even though it was heavy,
the aircraft weight
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shouldn't have affected
the performance too much.
240
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What about mechanical failure?
241
00:15:22,188 --> 00:15:24,440
I'll get the
maintenance reports.
242
00:15:27,235 --> 00:15:30,321
Investigators make sure
that the maintenance is clean,
243
00:15:30,321 --> 00:15:32,657
and the aircraft has
a clean bill of health
244
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prior to the flight.
245
00:15:37,537 --> 00:15:40,206
It was up to date
in its maintenance cycle.
246
00:15:40,206 --> 00:15:43,584
No work deferred.
No technical exemptions.
247
00:15:43,584 --> 00:15:47,380
The maintenance reports
provide no leads.
248
00:15:48,297 --> 00:15:51,134
Maybe there was an
environmental factor at play.
249
00:15:52,427 --> 00:15:53,886
Take a look at this.
250
00:15:54,887 --> 00:15:58,016
Did the location of the
airport have something to do
251
00:15:58,016 --> 00:15:59,475
with the stall?
252
00:16:00,518 --> 00:16:02,812
The temperature is
23 degrees Celsius.
253
00:16:02,812 --> 00:16:04,355
So it's hot.
254
00:16:04,355 --> 00:16:07,191
Tamanrasset is in
a harsh desert climate
255
00:16:07,191 --> 00:16:08,484
and the high temperatures
256
00:16:08,484 --> 00:16:10,778
can affect the aircraft's
performance and climb.
257
00:16:12,572 --> 00:16:16,951
And the airport sits at
4,518 feet above sea level.
258
00:16:17,827 --> 00:16:20,580
At this altitude,
the air is already thin.
259
00:16:20,580 --> 00:16:24,792
If you factor in the heat,
it's high-density altitude
260
00:16:24,792 --> 00:16:27,462
that affects the performance
of the airplane.
261
00:16:27,462 --> 00:16:30,548
So, it's generating much less
lift over the wings,
262
00:16:30,548 --> 00:16:34,427
so it takes longer to get
the airplane airborne.
263
00:16:34,427 --> 00:16:36,888
So just a few pounds
below max take-off weight.
264
00:16:36,888 --> 00:16:39,182
High elevation airport.
265
00:16:39,182 --> 00:16:42,393
High temperature.
Landing gear extended.
266
00:16:42,393 --> 00:16:44,979
That could definitely
cause a plane to stall.
267
00:16:44,979 --> 00:16:48,399
But that doesn't explain
the explosion.
268
00:16:48,399 --> 00:16:51,277
Right. What are we missing?
269
00:16:57,867 --> 00:17:02,163
Investigators study
the crash site of Flight 62-89
270
00:17:02,163 --> 00:17:04,874
for evidence that could
explain the explosion
271
00:17:04,874 --> 00:17:06,834
heard seconds after takeoff.
272
00:17:08,378 --> 00:17:14,092
So, the first point
of impact is here...
273
00:17:14,092 --> 00:17:18,429
5,396 feet from
the takeoff point.
274
00:17:18,429 --> 00:17:22,016
Skidded through the airport
perimeter fence, across the road
275
00:17:22,016 --> 00:17:23,685
and came to rest here,
276
00:17:23,685 --> 00:17:27,688
less than three hundred feet
outside of the airport.
277
00:17:36,364 --> 00:17:37,657
The plane is destroyed
by the fire
278
00:17:37,657 --> 00:17:40,118
but the main wreckage
is practically in one piece,
279
00:17:40,118 --> 00:17:41,452
except for the rear section.
280
00:17:41,452 --> 00:17:44,705
And, look at this debris.
281
00:17:44,705 --> 00:17:48,376
This was on the runway,
right about here.
282
00:17:50,294 --> 00:17:51,587
Engine debris.
283
00:17:53,715 --> 00:17:56,217
On the runway we found a large
quantity of engine debris
284
00:17:56,217 --> 00:17:58,302
which is indicative
of an engine shelling
285
00:17:58,302 --> 00:18:02,890
when a large quantity of engine
blades are thrown out
286
00:18:02,890 --> 00:18:04,559
the back end of an engine.
287
00:18:06,352 --> 00:18:09,230
It's an old adage
in accident investigation,
288
00:18:09,230 --> 00:18:12,900
"What fails first falls first."
289
00:18:12,900 --> 00:18:16,904
So, if they find debris prior
to finding the wreckage,
290
00:18:16,904 --> 00:18:19,574
then they know that
happened prior to the accident.
291
00:18:19,574 --> 00:18:21,784
So one of the engines
blew out.
292
00:18:21,784 --> 00:18:25,580
That must have been the
explosion the controller heard.
293
00:18:25,580 --> 00:18:28,833
What caused
the engine failure?
294
00:18:30,626 --> 00:18:32,628
We needed to get our eyes
on those engines
295
00:18:32,628 --> 00:18:35,131
to determine which failed
and why it failed.
296
00:18:36,049 --> 00:18:38,468
Investigators begin
a visual inspection
297
00:18:38,468 --> 00:18:41,929
of the plane's engines,
starting with the right one.
298
00:18:42,680 --> 00:18:45,266
Take a look
at the fan blades.
299
00:18:46,309 --> 00:18:48,686
Hmm. Heavy deformation.
300
00:18:48,686 --> 00:18:51,606
It was definitely rotating
at the time of impact.
301
00:18:52,774 --> 00:18:55,777
On the right engine showed
that it was turning at impact.
302
00:18:55,777 --> 00:18:58,404
We don't know at exactly
what level of thrust
303
00:18:58,404 --> 00:18:59,781
it was rotating at.
304
00:19:02,533 --> 00:19:06,037
If the right engine
was operating on impact,
305
00:19:06,037 --> 00:19:07,955
then did the left engine fail?
306
00:19:12,543 --> 00:19:14,962
These turbine blades
have far fewer deformations
307
00:19:14,962 --> 00:19:16,047
than the right engine.
308
00:19:16,047 --> 00:19:18,466
It looks like it
was barely moving.
309
00:19:18,466 --> 00:19:22,553
The hot section
is completely torn apart.
310
00:19:22,553 --> 00:19:24,639
In an engine's hot section,
311
00:19:24,639 --> 00:19:27,558
fuel is ignited
in a combustion chamber,
312
00:19:27,558 --> 00:19:30,228
generating a powerful stream
of hot air
313
00:19:30,228 --> 00:19:32,814
that spins the turbine blades.
314
00:19:34,982 --> 00:19:38,152
The damage is evidence that
the left engine failed.
315
00:19:39,070 --> 00:19:41,489
We knew that the failure was
in the hot section
316
00:19:41,489 --> 00:19:43,616
and so we had to follow every
lead that we could
317
00:19:43,616 --> 00:19:46,661
to determine where
the failure occurred.
318
00:19:53,167 --> 00:19:55,712
There's a bunch of blades
missing from the hot section.
319
00:19:56,838 --> 00:19:59,632
The missing pieces
are most likely
320
00:19:59,632 --> 00:20:01,175
the debris that we found
on the runway.
321
00:20:01,175 --> 00:20:04,637
We found that the hot section
was basically 'corn cobbed'
322
00:20:04,637 --> 00:20:09,183
as we say. There was not many
blades left in the hot section
323
00:20:09,183 --> 00:20:11,269
and there was metal
all over the place.
324
00:20:11,269 --> 00:20:14,355
What caused
the blades to break?
325
00:20:14,355 --> 00:20:16,566
Let's get some of these
parts out on the table.
326
00:20:18,443 --> 00:20:20,778
We wanted to further
tear down the engine.
327
00:20:20,778 --> 00:20:23,406
We wanted to look at the
failures under the microscope.
328
00:20:23,406 --> 00:20:24,991
We wanted to look at
the metallurgical aspects
329
00:20:24,991 --> 00:20:26,951
of the failure. We wanted to
look to see
330
00:20:26,951 --> 00:20:28,870
if there was a bird strike.
331
00:20:28,870 --> 00:20:31,831
Investigators begin
by examining components
332
00:20:31,831 --> 00:20:36,419
from the hot section in search
of pre-existing defects.
333
00:20:38,129 --> 00:20:40,923
I managed to remove the
sediment from the nozzle vane.
334
00:20:46,471 --> 00:20:49,265
Nozzle guide vanes
direct the hot air flow
335
00:20:49,265 --> 00:20:50,850
in the combustion chamber
336
00:20:50,850 --> 00:20:53,561
to the blades of the
high-pressure turbine,
337
00:20:53,561 --> 00:20:55,396
causing them to spin.
338
00:21:00,818 --> 00:21:02,820
Interesting.
339
00:21:15,416 --> 00:21:18,669
It looks like there's a fatigue
crack in the nozzle guide vane.
340
00:21:20,213 --> 00:21:23,132
Investigators find evidence
of fatigue cracks
341
00:21:23,132 --> 00:21:26,636
in two of the left engine's
nozzle guide vanes.
342
00:21:27,678 --> 00:21:29,639
This type of cracking
occurs over time,
343
00:21:29,639 --> 00:21:33,476
and as the engine ages,
these cracks get slightly larger
344
00:21:33,476 --> 00:21:35,269
and eventually they will fail.
345
00:21:35,269 --> 00:21:37,939
And it will destroy
the entire engine.
346
00:21:40,608 --> 00:21:42,402
If this was
a progressive failure,
347
00:21:42,402 --> 00:21:44,195
why wasn't it caught earlier?
348
00:21:46,614 --> 00:21:49,283
This type of cracking
is typical of an older engine
349
00:21:49,283 --> 00:21:50,785
and it's a progressive failure.
350
00:21:50,785 --> 00:21:52,662
So that gets us into
the question of what was
351
00:21:52,662 --> 00:21:55,498
the maintenance history,
what was the inspection criteria
352
00:21:55,498 --> 00:21:56,874
that was used by the operator?
353
00:21:58,292 --> 00:22:02,630
Investigators look into
the engine's repair history.
354
00:22:04,215 --> 00:22:05,758
It looks like the left engine
355
00:22:05,758 --> 00:22:08,302
was completely overhauled
four years ago.
356
00:22:09,095 --> 00:22:10,430
When would have been
the last time
357
00:22:10,430 --> 00:22:11,931
they looked at these
nozzle guide vanes?
358
00:22:11,931 --> 00:22:15,351
During the Hot Section
Maintenance Inspection,
359
00:22:15,351 --> 00:22:17,186
which was last year.
360
00:22:17,186 --> 00:22:19,272
Any mention of cracking?
361
00:22:19,272 --> 00:22:20,732
Any work done on any of them?
362
00:22:22,734 --> 00:22:25,528
Inspections of the hot section
are meant to catch
363
00:22:25,528 --> 00:22:29,574
fatigue cracks.
So why weren't these found?
364
00:22:29,574 --> 00:22:32,660
Since this was an Algerian
registered aircraft,
365
00:22:32,660 --> 00:22:34,996
it falls under the authority
of the Algerian civil
366
00:22:34,996 --> 00:22:40,418
aviation authority for oversight
of the inspection not the FAA,
367
00:22:40,418 --> 00:22:42,920
which typically has more
stringent requirements.
368
00:22:44,297 --> 00:22:46,049
The crack formed
at some point.
369
00:22:46,049 --> 00:22:48,509
It was missed during
the inspection last year.
370
00:22:48,509 --> 00:22:50,553
It grew and grew until point
of failure
371
00:22:50,553 --> 00:22:52,388
and then blew out at takeoff.
372
00:22:52,388 --> 00:22:55,683
Yeah. That explains
why the engine failed,
373
00:22:55,683 --> 00:22:57,769
not why the plane stalled.
374
00:22:59,062 --> 00:23:01,647
Pilots are expected
to demonstrate their ability
375
00:23:01,647 --> 00:23:04,734
to fly out of a situation
376
00:23:04,734 --> 00:23:08,404
either on takeoff or landing
when they've lost an engine.
377
00:23:08,404 --> 00:23:11,407
Investigators examine
the crew's training records
378
00:23:11,407 --> 00:23:15,369
to determine if they knew how to
handle a single-engine failure
379
00:23:15,369 --> 00:23:17,038
on take-off.
380
00:23:19,123 --> 00:23:21,626
The first officer's last
exercise in engine failure
381
00:23:21,626 --> 00:23:23,795
during takeoff
was four months ago.
382
00:23:23,795 --> 00:23:26,297
The captain's training
was even more recent,
383
00:23:26,297 --> 00:23:27,799
only two months
before the crash.
384
00:23:27,799 --> 00:23:30,593
They both should have known
what to do in this situation.
385
00:23:33,054 --> 00:23:36,683
They've got the airplane
veering to the left.
386
00:23:36,683 --> 00:23:38,976
There's no way they didn't
know that engine failed.
387
00:23:40,812 --> 00:23:42,814
So what did they
actually do?
388
00:23:47,944 --> 00:23:49,862
Investigators
prepare to listen
389
00:23:49,862 --> 00:23:56,494
to the cockpit voice recorder
from Air Algérie Flight 62-89.
390
00:23:56,494 --> 00:23:58,329
It was very important for us
to listen to the CVR
391
00:23:58,329 --> 00:24:02,458
to determine how the pilots
dealt with this engine failure.
392
00:24:02,458 --> 00:24:04,961
I've got it cued up
to right before takeoff.
393
00:24:07,672 --> 00:24:09,465
V1.
394
00:24:09,465 --> 00:24:11,759
Rotate.
395
00:24:17,849 --> 00:24:18,850
Gear up.
396
00:24:21,561 --> 00:24:24,147
They hear the sound
of the engine failing
397
00:24:24,147 --> 00:24:26,065
five seconds after takeoff.
398
00:24:26,941 --> 00:24:29,152
Bismillah.
What's going on?
399
00:24:31,154 --> 00:24:33,740
- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.
400
00:24:37,952 --> 00:24:40,830
They transferred control
in the middle of an emergency?
401
00:24:40,830 --> 00:24:43,416
That didn't even sound
like a proper transfer.
402
00:24:43,416 --> 00:24:45,084
He just took the controls.
403
00:24:45,960 --> 00:24:48,671
For another pilot
to take control
404
00:24:48,671 --> 00:24:50,840
from the pilot who is flying,
405
00:24:50,840 --> 00:24:53,593
the pilot needs to say,
'I've got it'.
406
00:24:53,593 --> 00:24:55,553
Taking control of the airplane
without saying
407
00:24:55,553 --> 00:24:58,598
he was taking control
made things worse for him
408
00:24:58,598 --> 00:24:59,891
and for the first officer.
409
00:24:59,891 --> 00:25:02,435
The captain
is the pilot monitoring.
410
00:25:02,435 --> 00:25:03,853
He shouldn't be taking over.
411
00:25:03,853 --> 00:25:06,022
He should be
diagnosing the problem.
412
00:25:06,022 --> 00:25:10,026
So, do either of them
identify a left engine failure?
413
00:25:11,986 --> 00:25:14,238
After handing over control
to the captain,
414
00:25:14,238 --> 00:25:17,867
the first officer realizes
they aren't properly configured
415
00:25:17,867 --> 00:25:20,203
to climb with only one engine.
416
00:25:22,747 --> 00:25:24,874
Gear up, or are we okay?
417
00:25:24,874 --> 00:25:27,126
But there's no response
from the captain.
418
00:25:29,087 --> 00:25:31,047
We have a small problem,
62-89.
419
00:25:31,047 --> 00:25:33,549
62-89,
Tamanrasset.
420
00:25:35,885 --> 00:25:38,096
Just seconds after
the engine failure
421
00:25:38,096 --> 00:25:42,642
the situation deteriorates
as the plane begins to stall.
422
00:25:47,522 --> 00:25:50,566
There are no attempts
by the pilots to work together
423
00:25:50,566 --> 00:25:53,820
to identify or troubleshoot
the problem.
424
00:25:53,820 --> 00:25:55,363
Let go.
Take your hand away.
425
00:25:55,363 --> 00:25:56,906
- I let go. I let go.
- Let go.
426
00:25:56,906 --> 00:25:58,825
Take your hand away.
- I let go.
427
00:25:58,825 --> 00:26:01,285
Don't sink. Don't sink.
428
00:26:01,285 --> 00:26:03,788
Seconds later, the Ground
Proximity Warning activates,
429
00:26:03,788 --> 00:26:05,957
indicating the plane is getting
430
00:26:05,957 --> 00:26:08,668
dangerously close
to the ground.
431
00:26:10,420 --> 00:26:12,255
- Please!
- Take your hand away!
432
00:26:14,006 --> 00:26:16,092
Both pilots really didn't know
what the other was doing,
433
00:26:16,092 --> 00:26:18,177
didn't know what the other
expected of them,
434
00:26:18,177 --> 00:26:21,723
and may well have been working
at cross purposes.
435
00:26:21,723 --> 00:26:24,642
And as a result of that,
the team performance broke down.
436
00:26:26,978 --> 00:26:30,106
Don't sink. Don't sink.
437
00:26:34,485 --> 00:26:37,155
I don't hear a single
mention of engine failure.
438
00:26:37,155 --> 00:26:39,741
And why was he telling
her to let go so many times?
439
00:26:39,741 --> 00:26:42,118
Was she trying to take back
control of the plane?
440
00:26:42,118 --> 00:26:45,496
Which one of them
is actually flying the plane?
441
00:26:45,496 --> 00:26:48,791
When all is said and done, the
pilots did not work together.
442
00:26:48,791 --> 00:26:51,627
Without more information
from the flight data recorder,
443
00:26:51,627 --> 00:26:53,713
we really don't know
exactly what they did
444
00:26:53,713 --> 00:26:55,548
to control the airplane.
445
00:26:55,548 --> 00:26:59,886
Investigators turn to the
Flight Data Recorder, or FDR,
446
00:26:59,886 --> 00:27:04,682
from Flight 62-89 to determine
how the pilots tried to recover
447
00:27:04,682 --> 00:27:07,810
from the loss
of the left engine.
448
00:27:07,810 --> 00:27:09,937
Flight data recorders
are important to investigators
449
00:27:09,937 --> 00:27:13,483
because it gives them
information on how the pilots
450
00:27:13,483 --> 00:27:16,986
were operating the airplane
and how they were managing
451
00:27:16,986 --> 00:27:20,073
the critical situation
they were in.
452
00:27:21,449 --> 00:27:23,409
Not much here.
453
00:27:23,409 --> 00:27:25,745
Older plane, older FDR.
454
00:27:26,913 --> 00:27:28,164
It doesn't actually tell us
455
00:27:28,164 --> 00:27:30,416
how the pilots were handling
the engine failure.
456
00:27:32,335 --> 00:27:35,588
Because we only had five
parameters on the FDR,
457
00:27:35,588 --> 00:27:37,548
we had to go to Boeing
and ask for a detailed
458
00:27:37,548 --> 00:27:41,844
aircraft performance analysis
to determine what happened
459
00:27:41,844 --> 00:27:43,304
on this accident flight.
460
00:27:45,890 --> 00:27:48,476
Using the FDR's limited data,
461
00:27:48,476 --> 00:27:51,854
Boeing's performance
study includes a reconstruction
462
00:27:51,854 --> 00:27:54,190
of engine operations
and flight controls
463
00:27:54,190 --> 00:27:56,526
in the final moments
of the flight.
464
00:27:58,820 --> 00:28:01,864
So, there is the left engine
losing its thrust
465
00:28:01,864 --> 00:28:03,366
after it blows out.
466
00:28:04,575 --> 00:28:06,119
That's odd.
467
00:28:06,119 --> 00:28:08,871
The data from the fully
functioning right engine
468
00:28:08,871 --> 00:28:11,416
shows something unexpected.
469
00:28:12,208 --> 00:28:14,627
Look at the thrust
from the right engine.
470
00:28:14,627 --> 00:28:17,046
Yes, it seems to be
going up and down.
471
00:28:17,046 --> 00:28:18,798
But we know
it was working fine.
472
00:28:18,798 --> 00:28:21,342
That can only mean
one thing.
473
00:28:25,430 --> 00:28:27,724
Bismillah.
What's going on?
474
00:28:27,724 --> 00:28:29,058
The team finds evidence
475
00:28:29,058 --> 00:28:32,395
of thrust being added
to the right engine.
476
00:28:33,271 --> 00:28:34,856
Let go, let go.
477
00:28:34,856 --> 00:28:36,566
And then pulled back.
478
00:28:36,566 --> 00:28:38,192
I let go. I let go.
479
00:28:39,527 --> 00:28:41,487
When one engine fails,
480
00:28:41,487 --> 00:28:44,782
what you need is maximum
power on the other engine,
481
00:28:44,782 --> 00:28:46,909
not reduce it.
482
00:28:46,909 --> 00:28:49,662
So thrust is pulled down,
483
00:28:49,662 --> 00:28:54,208
then back up, then down,
then back up again.
484
00:28:55,251 --> 00:28:57,545
We have a small problem,
62-89.
485
00:28:57,545 --> 00:28:59,630
62-89,
Tamanrasset.
486
00:29:04,552 --> 00:29:05,845
Let go.
487
00:29:08,306 --> 00:29:12,602
It's as if they were having
some sort of a tug of war?
488
00:29:12,602 --> 00:29:14,437
They shouldn't have been.
489
00:29:14,437 --> 00:29:17,148
The first officer did
the right thing by increasing
490
00:29:17,148 --> 00:29:19,359
the power to the right engine.
491
00:29:19,359 --> 00:29:22,320
What likely happened is that
the captain wasn't fully aware
492
00:29:22,320 --> 00:29:25,782
of which engine had failed.
However, the first officer
493
00:29:25,782 --> 00:29:27,617
knew that the
left engine had failed
494
00:29:27,617 --> 00:29:30,620
and was trying to push up the
throttle on the right engine
495
00:29:30,620 --> 00:29:32,872
to keep them from stalling.
496
00:29:35,917 --> 00:29:37,251
Let go.
Take your hand away.
497
00:29:37,251 --> 00:29:38,961
- I let go. I let go.
- Let go.
498
00:29:38,961 --> 00:29:41,631
Take your hand away.
- I let go. I let go.
499
00:29:41,631 --> 00:29:44,926
Don't sink. Don't sink.
500
00:29:46,219 --> 00:29:48,221
The captain's basically
telling the first officer
501
00:29:48,221 --> 00:29:51,265
to get out of his way,
to leave him alone,
502
00:29:51,265 --> 00:29:56,396
to let him be in charge
of the airplane by himself,
503
00:29:56,396 --> 00:29:57,855
which he was.
504
00:29:57,855 --> 00:29:59,565
Knowing that the
left engine had failed,
505
00:29:59,565 --> 00:30:02,193
the first officer might have
been trying to help things out
506
00:30:02,193 --> 00:30:04,487
by increasing the power
on the right engine.
507
00:30:05,947 --> 00:30:08,408
- Please!
- Take your hand away!
508
00:30:13,329 --> 00:30:16,207
The moment the captain reduced
the thrust on the right engine
509
00:30:16,207 --> 00:30:18,918
and never returned it
to takeoff thrust,
510
00:30:18,918 --> 00:30:21,379
with the gear down,
it doomed the flight.
511
00:30:23,840 --> 00:30:25,717
The pilots should have
been able to work together
512
00:30:25,717 --> 00:30:27,010
to recover the plane.
513
00:30:28,052 --> 00:30:31,431
These planes are designed
to fly with a team.
514
00:30:31,431 --> 00:30:35,518
Pilot flying, pilot not flying,
both have very specific roles
515
00:30:35,518 --> 00:30:40,565
that they are trained to do,
especially in emergencies.
516
00:30:40,565 --> 00:30:43,776
They stay in their roles,
they help each other,
517
00:30:43,776 --> 00:30:46,029
they work as a team,
and this crash
518
00:30:46,029 --> 00:30:48,281
could have been avoided
if they would have done that.
519
00:30:50,408 --> 00:30:54,454
Why didn't the crew
of Air Algérie Flight 62-89
520
00:30:54,454 --> 00:30:59,042
work together to prevent
the loss of 102 lives.
521
00:31:01,085 --> 00:31:05,965
Okay. I'll cue it up to
pre-flight preparations.
522
00:31:06,883 --> 00:31:09,844
Investigators return
to the cockpit voice recording
523
00:31:09,844 --> 00:31:12,055
of Flight 62-89
524
00:31:12,055 --> 00:31:15,016
to understand why there
was a lack of coordination
525
00:31:15,016 --> 00:31:16,976
between the two pilots.
526
00:31:18,686 --> 00:31:22,607
Nav and instrument
transfer switches... Normal.
527
00:31:22,607 --> 00:31:26,652
Yaw Damper... On.
528
00:31:28,571 --> 00:31:30,948
They listen as the
First Officer works through
529
00:31:30,948 --> 00:31:32,909
the Pre-flight checklist.
530
00:31:32,909 --> 00:31:35,912
They're surprised by what
they don't hear.
531
00:31:37,747 --> 00:31:39,415
Where's the captain?
532
00:31:39,415 --> 00:31:41,501
Is she doing the flight
preparation by herself?
533
00:31:43,878 --> 00:31:47,799
Pressurization
Mode Selector... Auto.
534
00:31:47,799 --> 00:31:50,927
Okay, flight instruments...
535
00:31:50,927 --> 00:31:52,804
We found that the
first officer was actually
536
00:31:52,804 --> 00:31:54,764
in the cockpit by herself
537
00:31:54,764 --> 00:31:57,642
conducting most
of the pre-flight work
538
00:31:57,642 --> 00:31:59,185
without the captain.
539
00:32:01,896 --> 00:32:04,774
It's unusual for the captain
not to be present
540
00:32:04,774 --> 00:32:07,235
during the pre-flight because
there were responsibilities
541
00:32:07,235 --> 00:32:12,281
that the captain has to get his
side of the airplane ready.
542
00:32:12,281 --> 00:32:16,285
It's just inappropriate for the
captain not to be in the cockpit
543
00:32:16,285 --> 00:32:19,288
during the pre-flight
and it's actually kind of rude.
544
00:32:20,289 --> 00:32:22,583
It's only after the
First Officer completes
545
00:32:22,583 --> 00:32:27,130
the pre-flight preparations that
the captain enters the cockpit.
546
00:32:27,130 --> 00:32:29,465
The last QNH
1-0-1-9.
547
00:32:29,465 --> 00:32:32,051
1-0-1-9, roger.
548
00:32:32,051 --> 00:32:33,636
Good afternoon, Captain.
549
00:32:33,636 --> 00:32:35,054
How are we looking?
550
00:32:35,054 --> 00:32:38,099
Uh, good. I completed
the pre-flight checklist,
551
00:32:38,099 --> 00:32:41,686
I tested your oxygen,
and everything is set to go.
552
00:32:41,686 --> 00:32:43,146
Good, good.
553
00:32:45,106 --> 00:32:47,608
Captain Benaouicha's late,
554
00:32:47,608 --> 00:32:50,653
leaving his responsibilities
to the first officer.
555
00:32:50,653 --> 00:32:52,030
When the captain showed up,
556
00:32:52,030 --> 00:32:56,117
he was not in the mindset
of getting brought up to speed
557
00:32:56,117 --> 00:32:58,411
or being part of the team
of setting the cockpit up
558
00:32:58,411 --> 00:32:59,537
for the flight.
559
00:33:02,915 --> 00:33:04,125
Heading.
560
00:33:04,125 --> 00:33:06,502
Zero-two-zero.
561
00:33:06,502 --> 00:33:08,171
Altitude.
562
00:33:08,171 --> 00:33:10,673
Investigators then hear
the pilots performing
563
00:33:10,673 --> 00:33:12,842
their Before Start Checklist.
564
00:33:12,842 --> 00:33:14,552
Two-eight-zero.
565
00:33:14,552 --> 00:33:17,096
You know,
I could have been on the team
566
00:33:17,096 --> 00:33:18,681
with those boys back there?
567
00:33:18,681 --> 00:33:20,016
Give me a break.
568
00:33:20,016 --> 00:33:21,934
Who's the third voice?
569
00:33:21,934 --> 00:33:24,103
A flight attendant?
570
00:33:25,355 --> 00:33:29,108
The only male flight attendant
is the chief flight attendant.
571
00:33:31,194 --> 00:33:33,071
Okay, takeoff speeds.
572
00:33:33,071 --> 00:33:34,989
As part of the checklist,
573
00:33:34,989 --> 00:33:38,076
the First Officer reviews
the takeoff speeds.
574
00:33:40,119 --> 00:33:45,458
V1 - 144 knots.
VR - 146 knots.
575
00:33:45,458 --> 00:33:47,835
You're saying you were
good enough to turn pro?
576
00:33:47,835 --> 00:33:51,047
Oh yeah, I was a good
footie player.
577
00:33:51,047 --> 00:33:52,965
Even had a scout
come and watch me play.
578
00:33:52,965 --> 00:33:55,968
Yeah, they were scouting
you to mow the pitch.
579
00:33:55,968 --> 00:33:58,763
Um, V2 - 150 knots.
580
00:33:58,763 --> 00:34:01,516
Okay, that's enough.
I understand.
581
00:34:01,516 --> 00:34:05,061
Can we go? I got it.
I got it. Let's go.
582
00:34:10,316 --> 00:34:11,859
So the captain is just
carrying on a conversation with
583
00:34:11,859 --> 00:34:14,862
his friend while they're doing
their Before Start Checklist?
584
00:34:14,862 --> 00:34:16,447
What is even worse
is he cuts her off
585
00:34:16,447 --> 00:34:18,324
before they could
even finish it.
586
00:34:20,576 --> 00:34:23,204
One of the most important
parts of the information
587
00:34:23,204 --> 00:34:26,249
that she was trying to give were
the takeoff speeds,
588
00:34:26,249 --> 00:34:29,877
and then there should have been
a briefing
589
00:34:29,877 --> 00:34:33,589
of an engine failure departure.
590
00:34:33,589 --> 00:34:36,175
At this airport that was
a special departure
591
00:34:36,175 --> 00:34:39,637
that needed to be briefed.
It was ignored.
592
00:34:41,639 --> 00:34:43,891
Did the captain become
more focused
593
00:34:43,891 --> 00:34:45,601
once they began to taxi?
594
00:34:46,602 --> 00:34:50,022
Roger, taxing
for runway zero two.
595
00:34:50,022 --> 00:34:52,900
What investigators
find most shocking
596
00:34:52,900 --> 00:34:55,361
is what they hear next.
597
00:34:59,073 --> 00:35:01,117
Where are we eating tonight?
598
00:35:01,117 --> 00:35:03,077
That place across
from the hotel.
599
00:35:03,077 --> 00:35:06,122
Oh. You always go back
to the same place.
600
00:35:06,122 --> 00:35:07,957
I like what I like.
601
00:35:07,957 --> 00:35:09,208
We are in Algiers!
602
00:35:09,208 --> 00:35:12,378
Plenty of good spots to eat.
603
00:35:12,378 --> 00:35:15,214
They are completely
distracted. They are violating
604
00:35:15,214 --> 00:35:17,175
every sterile cockpit rule.
605
00:35:18,968 --> 00:35:20,511
During critical
phases of flight,
606
00:35:20,511 --> 00:35:23,056
extraneous conversations
and non-essential conversations
607
00:35:23,056 --> 00:35:25,183
between the crew members
are prohibited.
608
00:35:25,183 --> 00:35:27,935
Not only is the Captain
dismissing the First Officer
609
00:35:27,935 --> 00:35:33,316
he has this casual attitude
about basic safety practices.
610
00:35:33,316 --> 00:35:35,443
It's possible he was
more interested in talking
611
00:35:35,443 --> 00:35:38,863
to the flight attendant than
reviewing the briefing
612
00:35:38,863 --> 00:35:40,198
with the first officer.
613
00:35:40,198 --> 00:35:42,366
It's possible that he had been
through so many
614
00:35:42,366 --> 00:35:44,535
pre-flight takeoff briefings
615
00:35:44,535 --> 00:35:47,371
that at that time
he felt it was unnecessary.
616
00:35:51,167 --> 00:35:53,378
Bismillah.
What's going on?
617
00:35:56,381 --> 00:35:59,509
- Let go. Let go.
- I let go, I let go.
618
00:35:59,509 --> 00:36:01,719
As a result of his
dismissive attitude,
619
00:36:01,719 --> 00:36:04,597
the captain is unprepared
to properly respond
620
00:36:04,597 --> 00:36:07,725
when the crisis occurs
shortly after take-off.
621
00:36:11,938 --> 00:36:15,316
Had the pilots completed their
pre-flight safety briefing,
622
00:36:15,316 --> 00:36:17,443
their response
to the engine failure
623
00:36:17,443 --> 00:36:19,529
might have been very different.
624
00:36:26,077 --> 00:36:27,120
Gear up.
625
00:36:30,665 --> 00:36:34,544
Engine failure, left engine.
Fly V2 plus 25.
626
00:36:34,544 --> 00:36:37,255
Lowering the nose
to 12 degrees.
627
00:36:37,839 --> 00:36:40,717
V2. Gear up.
628
00:36:41,509 --> 00:36:43,386
Once the plane was stabilized,
629
00:36:43,386 --> 00:36:46,848
the pilots could have returned
safely to the airport.
630
00:36:46,848 --> 00:36:50,435
Engine failure is actually
a relatively common occurrence.
631
00:36:50,435 --> 00:36:53,730
Every pilot needs to be
prepared and trained.
632
00:36:53,730 --> 00:36:57,108
So, instead of letting
the first officer fly the plane
633
00:36:57,108 --> 00:36:58,484
while he diagnoses the issue,
634
00:36:58,484 --> 00:37:00,319
he tries to do
everything himself.
635
00:37:00,319 --> 00:37:04,031
And transferring control
during an emergency situation?
636
00:37:04,949 --> 00:37:07,577
There was never a positive
transfer of control.
637
00:37:07,577 --> 00:37:10,079
The captain just took
the control yoke
638
00:37:10,079 --> 00:37:13,541
away from the first officer,
639
00:37:13,541 --> 00:37:16,919
so he injected himself
in the emergency.
640
00:37:20,631 --> 00:37:24,010
- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.
641
00:37:24,010 --> 00:37:28,139
The captain took control
at the worst possible time
642
00:37:28,139 --> 00:37:29,307
when he was out of the loop.
643
00:37:29,307 --> 00:37:32,268
And by not assigning
responsibility to her,
644
00:37:32,268 --> 00:37:34,020
he gave himself
the responsibility
645
00:37:34,020 --> 00:37:35,521
of doing two things at once
646
00:37:35,521 --> 00:37:37,940
diagnosing the nature
of the engine problem
647
00:37:37,940 --> 00:37:39,692
and then flying the airplane.
648
00:37:41,444 --> 00:37:42,820
Please!
649
00:37:42,820 --> 00:37:46,324
By trying to fly the plane
and diagnose the problem
650
00:37:46,324 --> 00:37:49,786
on his own, the captain took
on too much.
651
00:37:51,663 --> 00:37:53,956
It put the first officer
in a very difficult position.
652
00:37:53,956 --> 00:37:59,545
She's now in the supportive
role, the non-flying role,
653
00:37:59,545 --> 00:38:01,923
waiting to be told what to do,
654
00:38:01,923 --> 00:38:06,469
and he's not giving any helpful
orders other than 'let go'.
655
00:38:09,514 --> 00:38:13,476
Why would an experienced
captain so brazenly dismiss
656
00:38:13,476 --> 00:38:15,395
his First Officer's help,
657
00:38:15,395 --> 00:38:17,897
risking the lives
of everyone onboard?
658
00:38:23,569 --> 00:38:26,322
Investigators look
into the pilots' backgrounds
659
00:38:26,322 --> 00:38:29,534
in an attempt to understand why
the captain took over
660
00:38:29,534 --> 00:38:32,745
from his first officer
in the midst of an emergency.
661
00:38:33,621 --> 00:38:36,874
So the captain actually
had twice as many flying hours
662
00:38:36,874 --> 00:38:38,334
as the first officer.
663
00:38:39,544 --> 00:38:42,797
The captain was both qualified
as a captain on a 7-3-7
664
00:38:42,797 --> 00:38:46,509
but also as a first officer
on a 7-6-7.
665
00:38:46,509 --> 00:38:50,346
Perhaps his attitude was
that flying the 7-37
666
00:38:50,346 --> 00:38:54,016
was not that big of a deal
because I fly a 7-67
667
00:38:54,016 --> 00:38:57,353
which is much more sophisticated
and highly technical.
668
00:38:58,187 --> 00:39:00,898
But she had more hours
on the 7-37.
669
00:39:00,898 --> 00:39:03,484
Not only did she have
more experience flying the 7-37
670
00:39:03,484 --> 00:39:06,487
that's the only plane
that she was flying.
671
00:39:07,697 --> 00:39:10,658
I think there's a good chance
that had she been left alone,
672
00:39:10,658 --> 00:39:13,703
she would have flown the
airplane out of the scenario
673
00:39:13,703 --> 00:39:16,080
that we saw in this accident.
674
00:39:16,080 --> 00:39:19,208
The question is, would
he have reacted the same way
675
00:39:19,208 --> 00:39:21,002
if the first officer was a man?
676
00:39:23,588 --> 00:39:27,383
In 2003, at the time of this
crash, here in the States,
677
00:39:27,383 --> 00:39:31,137
female airline pilots only
constituted less than 6%
678
00:39:31,137 --> 00:39:33,222
of the pilot population.
679
00:39:33,222 --> 00:39:34,891
And it really hasn't
changed that much
680
00:39:34,891 --> 00:39:37,602
in the 20 years since then.
681
00:39:38,519 --> 00:39:41,230
The first officer
was Algeria's first
682
00:39:41,230 --> 00:39:44,442
female commercial
airline pilot.
683
00:39:44,442 --> 00:39:47,737
My friend, male pilots
in this part of the world
684
00:39:47,737 --> 00:39:51,991
aren't used to sharing
a cockpit with women.
685
00:39:53,659 --> 00:39:56,079
I think Algeria
is becoming fairly westernized
686
00:39:56,079 --> 00:39:59,082
but, in some cultures,
there is the feeling that a man
687
00:39:59,082 --> 00:40:01,584
has to be up in the cockpit
in case anything goes wrong.
688
00:40:03,252 --> 00:40:06,255
Why did this captain take
control from the first officer
689
00:40:06,255 --> 00:40:08,966
when she was doing an okay job
at that point?
690
00:40:08,966 --> 00:40:11,427
And I think you can't rule out
the possibility
691
00:40:11,427 --> 00:40:14,430
that there may have been
some gender stereotyping
692
00:40:14,430 --> 00:40:17,558
on his part that
played a role in it.
693
00:40:19,352 --> 00:40:21,938
Sadly, this accident
was totally preventable.
694
00:40:26,567 --> 00:40:29,320
Investigators now have
a clear picture
695
00:40:29,320 --> 00:40:33,699
of what led to the crash
of Flight 62-89.
696
00:40:33,699 --> 00:40:40,456
V1, 144 knots.
VR, 146 knots...
697
00:40:40,456 --> 00:40:42,667
You're saying you were
good enough to turn pro?
698
00:40:42,667 --> 00:40:45,294
After arriving late and
allowing the flight attendant
699
00:40:45,294 --> 00:40:48,214
into the cockpit,
the captain interrupted
700
00:40:48,214 --> 00:40:50,633
a crucial pre-flight
safety briefing.
701
00:40:50,633 --> 00:40:54,137
Um, V2, 150 knots.
702
00:40:54,137 --> 00:40:56,431
Okay, that's enough.
I understand.
703
00:40:56,431 --> 00:40:59,892
Can we go? I got it.
I got it. Let's go.
704
00:40:59,892 --> 00:41:02,562
The captain demonstrated
a lax attitude
705
00:41:02,562 --> 00:41:05,732
towards cockpit protocols.
706
00:41:06,941 --> 00:41:09,068
Fatigue cracks
in a nozzle guide vane
707
00:41:09,068 --> 00:41:12,655
in the plane's left engine were
reaching their breaking point.
708
00:41:12,655 --> 00:41:15,032
And when the guide vane failed,
709
00:41:16,659 --> 00:41:19,078
it set off a chain reaction.
710
00:41:19,078 --> 00:41:22,582
High-speed metal fragments
ripped the engine apart.
711
00:41:23,458 --> 00:41:26,044
- Let go, let go.
- I let go. I let go.
712
00:41:26,044 --> 00:41:27,879
When crisis struck,
713
00:41:27,879 --> 00:41:30,965
the captain decided he needed
to be the one to handle
714
00:41:30,965 --> 00:41:34,761
the controls and took over
flying from his first officer
715
00:41:34,761 --> 00:41:37,138
before even identifying
the problem.
716
00:41:38,348 --> 00:41:41,851
The engine failure alone was
not the cause of this accident.
717
00:41:41,851 --> 00:41:44,437
Engines fail
and pilots are trained
718
00:41:44,437 --> 00:41:46,773
to handle those emergencies.
719
00:41:48,399 --> 00:41:52,362
Failing to retract the landing
gear after the engine failure
720
00:41:52,362 --> 00:41:54,447
made recovery more difficult.
721
00:41:54,447 --> 00:41:56,240
Let go!
Take your hand away!
722
00:41:56,240 --> 00:41:58,201
- I let go. I let go.
- Let go.
723
00:41:58,201 --> 00:42:00,703
Take your hand away!
- I let go!
724
00:42:08,378 --> 00:42:10,380
It was the captain's
assumption of control
725
00:42:10,380 --> 00:42:12,715
of the aircraft without
properly identifying
726
00:42:12,715 --> 00:42:14,884
the nature of the emergency,
727
00:42:14,884 --> 00:42:17,136
his failure to raise
the landing gear,
728
00:42:17,136 --> 00:42:21,557
and his lack of adherence
to standard operating procedures
729
00:42:21,557 --> 00:42:24,185
that eventually
doomed the flight.
730
00:42:26,521 --> 00:42:28,231
As a result of this accident,
731
00:42:28,231 --> 00:42:32,902
Algeria's Commission of Inquiry
makes several recommendations.
732
00:42:34,487 --> 00:42:36,697
They recommend
that Air Algérie,
733
00:42:36,697 --> 00:42:38,741
along with other operators,
ensure that their
734
00:42:38,741 --> 00:42:41,994
Crew Resource Management
training programs emphasize
735
00:42:41,994 --> 00:42:44,664
the importance of
handover procedures
736
00:42:44,664 --> 00:42:47,000
and task-sharing
in the cockpit.
737
00:42:48,376 --> 00:42:52,005
In the 1980's, they had
captains who were trying to fly
738
00:42:52,005 --> 00:42:54,716
a team airplane solo.
739
00:42:54,716 --> 00:42:58,761
So, a lot of training went
into it to teach that your
740
00:42:58,761 --> 00:43:01,055
best resource is your team.
741
00:43:01,055 --> 00:43:04,767
You support each other and work
together as a team
742
00:43:04,767 --> 00:43:07,937
for the safety of the airplane.
743
00:43:07,937 --> 00:43:10,690
The fact that the captain
insisted on taking over control
744
00:43:10,690 --> 00:43:14,652
of the airplane at that
critical moment...
745
00:43:14,652 --> 00:43:17,029
cost everybody on that
airplane their lives.
746
00:43:19,949 --> 00:43:23,369
I felt particularly
affected when I saw
747
00:43:23,369 --> 00:43:25,413
that the accident
was preventable.
748
00:43:25,413 --> 00:43:28,875
And I think the investigators
did the best job they could
749
00:43:28,875 --> 00:43:31,919
trying to discover why the crew
made the errors that they did.
750
00:43:31,919 --> 00:43:33,963
The next time that happens,
people won't die
751
00:43:33,963 --> 00:43:35,214
as a result of that.
752
00:43:36,883 --> 00:43:39,594
For Lynn Rippelmeyer,
it's one more example
753
00:43:39,594 --> 00:43:44,140
of why the industry needs
to continue evolving.
754
00:43:44,140 --> 00:43:49,645
The airlines now are much more
open to hiring women,
755
00:43:49,645 --> 00:43:51,731
to not having gender bias,
756
00:43:51,731 --> 00:43:53,691
realizing that women
do have a lot
757
00:43:53,691 --> 00:43:56,611
to contribute to the industry.
758
00:43:57,945 --> 00:44:00,615
And I think it's up to women
now to step up to the plate
759
00:44:00,615 --> 00:44:03,910
and take the opportunities
that the career offers.
760
00:44:03,910 --> 00:44:05,995
They're amazing.
761
00:44:22,720 --> 00:44:27,767
Subtitling: difuze